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SUMMARY
Although oil and gas exploration has been going on in East Africa for decades, until 
recently exploration activities grew more slowly compared to other regions in Africa. 
Today, there has been a series of oil and gas discoveries in several East African 
countries, including Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. Debate 
is however mounting over what effect the new oil and gas discoveries would have on 
East Africa, given the trajectory of older oil-producing countries in Africa, particularly 
Angola, Nigeria and Sudan. The challenge for East Africa is, therefore, how to maximize 
the potential benefits from the resources to avoid the under-developmental path that 
these other countries followed.
There is general consensus that lack of specialized skills is a major obstacle to Africa’s 
realization of its resource potentials. One instrument currently being adopted by most 
oil and gas resource-rich countries (both in and outside Africa) to deal with the skills 
problem and to enhance linkages between the oil and gas sector and other sectors 
of the economy is the formulation of local content policies (LCPs). Typically, LCPs 
require companies to give preferential treatment to nationals of the country in which 
they operate in matters of employment and in the procurement of goods and services. 
It is believed that this would result in technology transfer and facilitate the ability 
of the country to take charge of its own development. But LCPs come with certain 
tradeoffs: Their potential incompatibility with international trade agreements threatens 
their sustenance; they can create unrealistic expectations capable of discouraging 
investment; and they are easily prone to corruption. 
However, there is a strong case for emerging oil and gas-producing East African 
countries to consider adopting the LCP. The nascent nature of the oil and gas industry 
in the region means that these countries would not have the technical and even 
managerial expertise to meet the demands of the industry. And training and education 
are essential for economic development. The LCP appears to be a potent tool to train 
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local professionals. The question however is how to design the policy to reflect the particular 
needs and circumstances of each country.
East African countries may consider adopting a localist approach to LCP by giving special 
consideration to the localities where the oil and gas and exploitation takes place. This approach 
may help them to address wider socio-economic problems associated with oil and gas 
development. They may also consider adopting a regional approach, which would enable all the 
countries to pull their resources together to jointly address the skills problem facing the region 
and thereby help one another. Given the enormous oil and gas skills gap in the region, it may help 
East Africa to avoid the imposition of stringent local content targets on oil and gas companies 
operating in the region and, instead, adopt an incremental and compartmentalized approach 
that takes stock of what skills are available, in what compartments at any given time and set their 
local content targets accordingly. Promotion of linkage development is essential to enhance 
the contribution of the oil and gas industry to the macro economy. Linkage development can 
facilitate technology transfer and economic diversification. But even these measures will have 
only minimal positive impact if the potential for elite capture and corruption is not addressed 
through the injection of transparency and accountability measures into the LCP design and 
implementation.
1INTRODUCTION
According to one news report, recent discoveries of oil and gas in East Africa has made the 
region the “new promised land”, comparable to the 19th century gold rush in South Africa, 
where South African gold rose from zero to 23 per cent of global supply within just a 
decade.1 The discoveries have been mostly in Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, Madagascar 
and Kenya, where significant progress towards commercial development has been made.2 
Although Kenya’s progress is more modest – with signals that bigger finds are on the way 
– Kenya is expanding investments in its oil and gas resources3 and already plays a pivotal 
role in the region as a transit route for oil products coming into and going out of the region.4 
Another news report has it that “[oil and gas] companies are waiting for [East African] 
policymakers to determine priorities and incentives before they can settle on investment 
plans.”5 
While the oil and gas discoveries put East African countries on the precipice of economic 
prosperity capable of bringing broad public welfare improvements to their citizens, there 
is cause for concern. The regions where the discoveries have been made in the respective 
countries fall mostly within the arid and semi-arid parts of the countries.6 This means that 
oil extraction in these countries is very likely to generate severe environmental problems 
for the surrounding local communities. In addition, a vast majority of the identified oil 
fields are located in troubled regions and on territories under dispute within and between 
the countries.7 Even in relatively peaceful Tanzania there are unsettled disputes between the 
Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar “over hypothetical royalties” for the yet to be discovered 
oil within the islands.8 In Kenya, most parts of the oil region have faced historical 
marginalization by successive governments.9 The struggle over scarce land and water 
resources in Kenya is spreading into oil, as local communities are already contesting the 
location of oil wells.10 In Madagascar – a country marked by protracted political instability, 
leading to suspension of international aid programs – local communities are poverty-
1 Zeddy Sambu, Oil and gas discoveries make East Africa a rich hunting ground for global explorers, Business Daily, 31 
December 2012, online: http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Oil-and-gas-discoveries-in-East-Africa-/-/539552/1654946/-/
vvmvcs/-/index.html. 
2 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Emerging East Africa Energy”, 23 May 2013, 1, http://www.eia.gov/countries/
analysisbriefs/East_Africa/eeae.pdf.
3 Ibid.
4 Energy Information Administration, “Emerging East Africa Energy”, 11 June 2013, online: http://www.eoearth.org/view/
article/229816/. 
5 The Africa Report, “Oil and Gas: East Africa’s Race to Get Ready”, 1 October 2012, http://www.theafricareport.com/North-
Africa/oil-and-gas-east-africas-race-to-get-ready.html. 
6 Chrispine Odour et al, “The Political Economy of the Extractive Sector” in Miriam W Oiro Omolo & Germano Mwabu, 
eds, A Primer to the Emerging Extractive Sector in Kenya: Resource Bliss, Dilemma or Curse (Nairobi: Institute Of 
Economic Affairs, 2014) at 181. 
7 DM Anderson & AJ Browne, “The Politics of Oil in East Africa” (2011) 5:2 Journal of East African Studies 395.
8 Ibid.
9 Odour et al (2014), supra note 6 at 181.
10 Luke Patey, “Kenya: An African Oil Upstart in Transition”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Paper: WPM 53, October 
2014, p. 23, online: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/WPM-53.pdf. 
2stricken, unstable and highly marginalized.11 In Uganda, it has been reported that since 
the oil discovery several wealthy Ugandans have been “scrambling to buy land” around 
the exploration area12 and that exploration activities have already caused distortions in 
the customary land tenure system in the oil region, conflict, displacement and substantial 
migration into the region.13 These have led some opposition politicians in Uganda to warn 
that the oil discovery could become “a curse” rather than a blessing “if it leads to more 
conflict in the country.”14 The Economist has therefore cautioned against the risk of “Dutch 
Disease” in East Africa.15 
The challenge for East Africa is how to maximize the potential benefits from the resources 
to avoid the under-developmental path that was the trajectory of most other oil producing 
countries in Africa, such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan. There is general consensus that 
lack of specialized expertise is a major obstacle to Africa’s realization of its resource 
potential. According to the World Bank, “[s]ignificant skills shortages exist both in terms 
of numbers and quality,” especially within the fields of science, technology, engineering 
and mathematics.16 The Bank notes that evidence from eight African countries (Angola, 
Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia) as well as 
evidence from six economic sectors in Africa (copper, diamonds, gold, oil and gas, mining 
services and timber) indicates that “skills, and the institutions that affect firm- and sector-
level capabilities, constitute the most important determinant of economic benefits.”17 
One of the instruments currently being adopted by most oil and gas resource-rich countries 
both in and outside Africa to deal with the skills problem and to enhance linkages between 
the oil and gas sector and the other sectors of the economy is the formulation of local 
content policies (LCPs). Defined as the requirement that “a given percentage of domestic 
value added or domestic components be embodied in a specified final product”,18 LCPs are 
undertaken to enable countries to maximize the gains of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
through the promotion of local participation in FDI and the use of local raw materials 
by investors.19 It is believed that this would result in technology transfer and facilitate 
the ability of the country to take charge of its own development. A number of African 
11 Association IRESA, Madagascar: The New Eldorado for Mining and Oil Companies, Friends of the Earth France & Friends 
of the Earth Europe, November 2012, 3, online: http://www.amisdelaterre.org/IMG/pdf/madagascareldoradooilmining-
foefrance.pdf.
12 See “Uganda Announces Oil Discovery”, IOL News, 9 October 2006, online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/uganda-
announces-oil-discovery-1.296822#.VXSgtM9VhBc.
13 Uganda Land Alliance, “Land Grabbing and Its Effects on the Communities in the Oil-rich Albertine Region of Uganda: 
The Case of Hoima, Buliisa and Amuru”, September 2011, 24–26, online: http://landgovernance.org/system/files/ULA%20
Land%20Grabbing%20Study%202nd%20October%202011.pdf. 
14 See “Uganda Announces Oil Discovery” (2006), supra note 12. 
15 The Economist, “Making the Most of a Good Situation”, 7 February 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/
baobab/2013/02/gas-discoveries-east-africa. 
16 World Bank, “Human Capital for the Oil, Gas and Minerals Industries”, Science, Technology, and Skills for Africa’s 
Development, March 2014, 1, online: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/0
3/05/000442464_20140305151740/Rendered/PDF/857140BRI0WB0H00Box382147B00PUBLIC0.pdf. 
17 Ibid at 2.
18 Gene M Grossman, “The Theory of Domestic Content Protection and Content Preference” (1981) 96:4 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 583.
19 Silvano Tordo et al, Local Content Policies in the Oil and Gas Sector, World Bank Study (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2013) at 120.
3countries, most notably Angola, Nigeria and Ghana, have adopted the LCP. In East Africa, 
Tanzania is probably the only country that has LCP legislation already in place, which is 
contained in its Petroleum Act, 2015, signed into law on August 4, 2015. Kenya’s ongoing 
review of its petroleum legislation includes regulations to promote local content (the 
Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production (Local Content) Regulations, 2014). 
It is expected that other emerging East African oil and gas countries will follow suit in the 
foreseeable future and that they will look to other oil and gas-rich countries where the LCP 
is already in place for possible lessons. They may do so without delay, given that Ghana’s 
delay in adopting its own LCP for three years after its oil discovery caused it to lose 
significant opportunities during the development phase of its Jubilee project.20
This paper is intended to outline and analyze policy perspectives and options that East 
African countries may consider in order to maximize the potential gains of the LCP. In 
addition to this introduction the paper is organized in three parts. The first part explains in 
detail the meaning of LCP and analyzes its pros and cons. The second part analyzes various 
options that East African countries may consider when formulating their LCP while the 
third part summarizes and concludes the discussion. 
THE LOCAL CONTENT POLICY: ESSENCE AND TRADEOFFS
Meaning of LCPs
As noted above, LCPs are a requirement that “a given percentage of domestic value 
added or domestic components be embodied in a specified final product.”21 They are 
regarded as a form of productive development policies whose goal is to “strengthen the 
productive structure of a particular national economy”.22 They are designed to increase 
local participation in foreign direct investment by directing the utilization of indigenous 
companies in goods and services procurement, the employment of locals and the use of 
local raw materials by investors. Other measures include tariffs, taxes, pricing, licencing 
and concession systems that are skewed in favour of local industries or aimed at facilitating 
the creation of local content by investors as well as local firm reservations for certain inputs 
and services.23 In practice, they require firms, particularly multinational firms operating 
within a country’s territory, to give “first consideration” or “deliberate preference” to the 
country’s nationals in matters of employment and training and in the procurement of goods 
and services. The requirements are either embedded in contractual agreements between 
governments and companies or enacted legislatively. In some cases, they are established 
in bidding rules as a precondition for winning contracts or embedded more indirectly in 
20 Kenya Civil Society Platform for Oil and Gas, “Setting the Agenda for the Development of Kenya’s Oil and Gas Resources 
– The Perspectives of Civil Society”, July 2014, 38, online: http://kcspog.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/KCSPOG_
Agenda_Setting_Report.pdf. 
21 Grossman (1981), supra note 18 at 583.
22 Alberto Melo & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, “Productive Development Policies and Supporting Institutions in Latin America 
and the Caribbean”, Inter-American Development Bank Research Department Competitive Studies Series Working Paper 
C-106, February 2006, p. 5, available at: http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubc-106.pdf.
23 Cathleen Cimino, Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J Schott, “A Proposed Code to Discipline Local Content Requirements”, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief No PB14–6, February 2014, p. 1, online: http://www.iie.com/
publications/pb/pb14-6.pdf.
4regulation and tax regimes through provision of incentives to local industries or to other 
companies that support local participation.24
Arguments in Favour of the Use of LCPs
There are several arguments in favour of LCPs. They can help to correct market failures,25 
which arise “when there is a distortion that keeps the market from allocating resources 
efficiently and adjusting to a steady state”, with the result that “domestic industries cannot 
gain the necessary technology and capacity to compete on the open market without outside 
intervention and protection.”26 The market fails from a domestic perspective, because the 
lack of domestic skills to serve the needs of the industry results in inefficient allocation of 
resources in the market. By requiring companies to invest in the development of particular 
local skills, LCPs can help to correct this market failure because such requirements help 
to ensure that skills are available to meet the demands of the market. Besides, there is an 
inherent good in a country developing its own technical skills to meet the demands of its 
industries. It enhances entrepreneurship and can contribute to poverty reduction.
LCPs can help domestic firms in developing countries integrate themselves into global 
economic networks. This is confirmed by studies which show that in the 1990s, both local 
“productivity-enhancing entrepreneurship” and state support to local development helped 
East Asian firms to achieve significant positions in global economic networks.27 It has also 
been argued that LCPs can contribute to the productivity and competitiveness of domestic 
firms through knowledge transfers that take place from foreign firms to domestic firms.28 
Other proponents observe that most advanced economies utilized industrial policies similar 
to LCPs to boost their domestic economy while in the early stages of their industrial 
development.29 After reviewing how countries like China, Chile and even the United States 
benefited from industrial policy (which later came into serious disfavour), Rodrik concludes 
that “developing new industries often requires a nudge from government. The nudge can 
take the form of subsidies, loans, infrastructure, and other kinds of support. But scratch the 
surface of any new successful industry anywhere, and more likely than not you will find 
government assistance lurking beneath.”30 This view is shared by many leading economists, 
24 Stanislaw Lec, “The Petroleum Sector Value Chain” in Silvana Tordo, Brandon S Tracy & Noora Arfa (eds.), “National 
Oil Companies and Value Chain”, World Bank Working Paper No 218, 2011, pp. 8–9, available at: http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/9780821388310.pdf. 
25 Tordo et al (2013), supra note 19 at pp. 24–25.
26 Alisa DiCaprio & Kevin P Gallagher, “The WTO and the Shrinking of Development Space: How Big is the Bite” (2006) 75 
The Journal of World Investment & Trade 783.
27 
Gary Gereffi, “Global Production Systems and Third World Development” in Barbara Stallings (ed.), Global Change, 
Regional Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 142.
28 See Oliver Morrissey, “FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Few Linkages, Fewer Spillovers” (2012) 24:1 European Journal of 
Development Research 26–31.
29 
Lindsay Whitfield et al, The Politics of African Industrial Policy: A Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015).
30 Dani Rodrik, “The Return of Industrial Policy,” Policy Innovations (April 13, 2010), online: http://www.policyinnovations.
org/ideas/innovations/data/000165. 
5such as Chang, who believes that developed countries should not “kick away the ladder” 
with which they had used to climb to the top of economic development.31
Arguments against the Use of LCPs
One of the most frequently cited argument against the use of LCPs is their potential 
incompatibility with international trade measures applicable to members of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Particular mention is made of the agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, and the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), all of which endorse the “national 
treatment” principle, which obliges member countries to treat one another as they would 
their own nationals. However, there are some limited exceptions for least developed 
and developing countries in the application of this rule. With regard to the ASCM, for 
example, domestic subsidies violate WTO rules only when they adversely affect the 
domestic commerce of another WTO member state.32 Few domestic subsidies meet this 
threshold, based in part, on the difficulty, for the complaining party, of showing evidence 
of “adverse effects” as well as on the fact that the definition of subsidy under the rules 
is narrow.33 This has led some scholars to suggest that countries should instead of using 
traditional LCP programs, make use of subsidies to support their domestic firms “on a 
time-limited basis.”34 Rodrik has argued that even though LCPs breach international trade 
and investment principles, they are an essential part of the “policy space” that developing 
countries ought to be allowed to pursue their economic development goals.35 This view is 
echoed by another commentator who notes that “fair trade” in the sense of a “level playing 
field” does not necessarily mean applying the same set of trade rules and conditions to 
every nation, but also means recognizing that some countries are so disadvantaged that 
they need “reasonable accommodation” under the international trade system.36 An analogy 
to this is the adoption of differential income tax rates according to levels of individual 
income in most developed countries, which is not necessarily regarded as “unfair” because 
it is justified by the principle of “reasonable accommodation” for the poor rather than 
condemned as “unjustifiable discrimination” against the rich.37 Fortunately for developing 
countries, however, the WTO rules impeding the application LCPs are rarely enforced.38
In addition, LCPs are said to be a poor instrument for addressing the inadequate 
contribution of the extractive sector to local economic development, for it creates 
31 Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder – Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London: Anthem Press, 
2002).
32 Cimino, Hufbauer & Schott (2014), supra note 23, p. 3. 
33 
Chilenye Nwapi, “Defining the ‘Local’ in Local Content Requirements in the Oil and Gas and Mining Sectors in 
Developing Countries” (2015) 8:1 Law & Development Review 194–195.
34 Cimino, Hufbauer & Schott (2014), supra note 23, p. 3.
35 Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007).
36 YS Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trade System, 2nd ed (forthcoming) (Cambride: Cambridge University Press, 
2016) at 462–463.
37 Ibid at 463.
38 Cimino, Hufbauer & Schott (2014), supra note 23, p. 1.
6distortions, inefficiency and corruption.39 As one commentator has noted, however, 
these arguments are generalizations. Inefficiency, for instance, may be as a result of 
“technological strangeness” – i.e., “the ability of the rest of the economy to develop 
service capacity through backward linkages and the speed at which such capacity can 
be created.”40 Moreover, these problems can be dealt with through a well-designed local 
content framework that takes into account the socio-political and economic climate in 
which it is to be applied. Corruption, for instance, can be addressed through the integration 
of transparency measures into the policy and the avoidance of setting corruption-inducing 
unrealistic targets for companies. 
Other arguments abound. For instance, it is believed that imposing quantitative conditions 
on companies regarding the hiring of locals when the existing local labour lacks the skills 
to carry out the desired task would not only discourage investment,41 but also could put 
undue pressure on companies. As one industry perspective puts it,
the issue is probably not just one of numbers of Nigerian employees or even of the 
proportion of Nigerians in senior technical or managerial positions. The real fuel for 
the controversies around the employment of Nigerians is most likely the fact that as 
more Nigerians are employed and progress to senior positions, they inevitably seek 
more opportunities for advancement and therefore the pressure to provide even more 
opportunities for Nigerians continues to increase. The push for the employment of more 
Nigerians thus feeds on itself.42
The problem of unrealistic expectations can, however, be addressed by a clear definition 
of what constitutes local content, and, even more importantly, by a country’s recognition 
and acknowledgment of its skills level and a compartmentalized and incremental approach 
to local content target setting, rather than stipulating stringent targets that are more likely 
to create corruption instead of helping to grow the economy. That is to say, occupations 
with high local skills availability can be assigned higher targets than occupations with 
lower local skills availability. And as more local skills are trained, the level of local content 
required can be increased gradually and correspondingly. This would however require a 
comprehensive, occupation by occupation skills survey of the country and the relevant 
sectors to determine where local skills are available and where they are scarce. It may be 
assumed that where needed skills are locally available it would be unnecessary to adopt an 
LCP because firms would find it in their interest to recruit locally as a cost-saving measure. 
Experience has shown, however, that this is not necessarily the case, especially with 
Chinese companies, which prefer to bring in their own staff and insist on being allowed to 
do so in their investment negotiations in Africa.
There is a strong case for emerging East African oil and gas producing countries to 
adopt the LCP. The nascent nature of the oil and gas industry in the region means that 
these countries would not have the technical and even managerial expertise to meet 
39 Lec (2011), supra note 24 at 9.
40 Ibid at 9–10.
41 J Emeka Nwaokoro, “Signed, Sealed but Will it Deliver? Nigeria’s Local Content Bill and Cross-Sectoral Growth” (2011) 
4:1 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 56.
42 Ike Oguine, “Nigerian Content in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry: Legal and Policy Issues” (2011) 29 J Energy & Nat 
Resources L 409.
7the demands of the industry. Mozambique, for instance, is characterized by lack of 
economic diversification, weak institutional capacity, high financing costs, a poorly 
qualified workforce and deficient infrastructure development.43 Domestic skills shortage 
in Mozambique is described as “crippling”, occasioned by “poor quality education, 
insufficient access to education and inadequate linkages between existing curricula and 
market demands.”44 A recent World Bank study notes that as the oil and gas industry is 
very new in Uganda, skills required by the industry are “quite low” in that country.45 This, 
arguably, is also the case in Madagascar and, even if to a lesser degree, in Kenya and 
Tanzania due to their relatively more developed economies. 
Studies have shown that training and education are essential for economic development. 
Between 1955 and 1961, for example, 225 personnel from the departments of medicine, 
engineering, and agriculture of South Korea’s Seoul National University received training 
and education at the University of Minnesota under a program designed by the U.S. 
government to support South Korea. The professionals returned to South Korea at the end 
of their training and contributed to the economic development of South Korea in their 
respective areas.46 Even though this program was not designed in the context of a local 
content strategy, it clearly indicates the importance of training in economic development. 
LCPs appear to be a potent tool for training local professionals. The question, however, is 
how to design the LCP to best reflect the economic development challenges of the adopting 
country. The analyses that follow examine some of the issues that East African countries 
should consider when adopting the LCP.
OPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FORMULATION OF LCPS
There are several options for East African countries. They may choose to adopt a national 
entrepreneurial development approach – the conventional approach – which focuses on 
enhancing the participation of a country’s “nationals” in the industry. They may choose to 
adopt a “localist” approach – being advocated by some scholars – which recognizes that 
the communities where the oil and gas resource projects are carried out bear the most brunt 
of the activities, by giving special consideration to such communities to alleviate their 
condition and minimize the potential of oil and gas development to generate conflicts. It has 
also been suggested that countries may choose to adopt a regional integration approach that 
is aimed at boosting regional rather than merely national competitiveness. What shape such 
an approach may take has scarcely been discussed. Countries may also choose to focus on 
training and education of local workforce. They may choose to focus on local procurement 
of goods and services to increase the participation of the national industry on a competitive 
43 African Development Bank Group, “Republic of Mozambique: Country Strategy Paper 2011–2015”, August 2011, pp. iv  
and 9, online: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Mozambique%20-%202011-
15%20CSP.pdf. 
44 Aditi Lalbahadur, “A Regional Approach to National Development Priorities in Mozambique?” 8 April 2013, http://www.
thetradebeat.com/opinion-analysis/a-regional-approach-to-national-development-priorities-in-mozambique. 
45 World Bank, “Leveraging Oil and Gas Industry for the Development of a Competitive Private Sector in Uganda”, Report 
No: ACS12528, 25 May 2015, 8, online: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/201
5/04/20/000442464_20150420122912/Rendered/PDF/ACS125280REVIS0itive0Private0Sector.pdf. 
46 Chilenye Nwapi & YS Lee, “Trade and Development in Africa” in YS Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trade 
System, 2nd ed (forthcoming) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) at 390, footnote 1797.
8basis. Or they may choose to focus on a broader goal of how to use the policy to enhance 
economic diversification (by promoting linkages to other sectors) to reduce economic 
dependency on the petroleum sector. These policy focuses are not mutually exclusive, and 
most countries have in fact adopted a broad approach that encompasses all of these. With 
each policy focus, however, there are inherent tradeoffs. The challenge for East African 
countries is to strike a balance between the clusters of stakeholders in the oil and gas sector 
and to prioritize their needs to meet legitimate citizen expectations. 
A. The Definition of “Local”
Most local content laws do not define explicitly the term “local” in local content. What 
local means can only be deciphered in their definitions of local content. Under section 106 
of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, 2010, for instance, the 
Nigerian content is defined as “the quantum of composite value added to or created in the 
Nigerian economy by a systematic development of capacity and capabilities through the 
deliberate utilization of Nigerian human, material resources and services in the Nigerian 
oil and gas industry”. In Ghana, Regulation 49 of the Petroleum (Local Content and Local 
Participation) Regulations, 2013 defines local content as “the quantum or percentage 
of locally produced materials, personnel, financing, goods and services rendered in the 
petroleum industry value chain and which can be measured in monetary terms”. Whereas 
in the case of Nigeria, there is explicit reference to “Nigerian economy” and Nigerian 
human and material resources and services, the Ghanaian Regulation speaks about “locally 
produced materials …” Thus, while one can easily assume that “local” in the Nigerian 
case is equivalent to “national”, there is some ambiguity in the Ghanaian model regarding 
whether local refers to “national” or to the region or locality within Ghana where the goods 
and services are produced. However, this ambiguity may be resolved by looking at some 
other provisions of the Regulation. For instance, Regulation 9 requires a company’s local 
content plan to contain detailed provisions that guarantee that “qualified Ghanaians are 
given first consideration” in matters of employment and that “adequate provision is made 
for the training of Ghanaians on the job”. This suggests that “local” is equivalent to national 
rather than the subnational locality or region where the oil and gas activities take place. 
This also represents the position in most other countries, including Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Indonesia. 
Kenya’s draft local content regulation adopts a definition of local content similar to the 
definitions adopted in Nigeria and Ghana and equally does not contain any definition of 
local. It is in fact worth noting that during discussions on the Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Act, the Kenyan government adopted the term “national content” instead of 
“local content” because, according to it, “‘Local’ may be misconstrued to mean particular 
communities where oil and gas operations are being conducted.”47 A recent study of LCPs 
in Ghana shows this concern to be accurate. According to the study, 
it was obvious that about 95% of the local communities either misunderstand or 
misapply the concept of local content. Instead, they understand local content and local 
47 See Ministry Reviews the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act Cap 308, online: http://ices.or.ke/ministry-reviews-
the-petroleum-exploration-and-production-act-cap-308/?print=print. 
9participation to mean, the considerations for offering employment, award of service 
contracts, allocation of CSR programmes and the award of scholarships inter alia 
should be offered first and foremost to the indigenes of the Western Region before any 
other Ghanaian.48
However, the draft Kenyan bill as well as the draft local content regulation that was finally 
prepared abandoned the term national content in favour of local content. While section 2 
of the draft regulation defines local content as “the use of Kenyan local expertise, goods 
and services, people, businesses and financing for the systematic development of national 
capacity and capabilities for the enhancement of the Kenyan economy”, however, section 85 
of the petroleum bill requires that “first consideration be given to services provided within 
the county and goods manufactured in the country” (italics mine). Provisions relating to 
employment and training are in relation to “Kenyans”.
An initial draft of Tanzania’s oil and gas industry LCP similarly adopts a national approach 
to an understanding of “local”. The document contains an explicit definition of local as 
“[t]he Tanzania Mainland and its people”.49 It defines local content as “[t]he added value 
brought to the country in the activities of the oil and gas industry in the United Republic 
of Tanzania through the participation and development of local Tanzanians and local 
businesses through national labour, technology, goods, services, capital and research 
capability.”50 At another point the document defines local content as “the added value 
brought to a host nation (and regional and local areas in that country) through the activities 
of the oil and gas industry.”51 The reference to “regional and local areas” is a remarkable 
departure from the position in other countries and represents specific recognition that the 
localities or regions where oil and gas resources are extracted deserve special recognition 
in the implementation of LCPs. In addition, the document recognizes the need to develop 
“local local content”,52 the essence being to give oil and gas companies the “social licence 
to operate” and to contribute to the growth of local communities to achieve a “mutually 
beneficial and sustainable” business environment.53 However, it does not require any 
special preference for the extractive localities or regions over other Tanzanians, but only 
encourages companies to, “as far as possible”, procure their workforce, materials and 
services from the communities in which they operate.54 In the final LCP legislation that 
was passed by the Tanzanian Parliament, however, the idea of “local local content” was 
abandoned.
The idea of “local local content” is consistent with what Warner has termed “community 
content”, i.e., “the interface of community investment programmes with local content”, 
which consists of “the strategic deployment of local participation and local capability 
48 Evangelia Fragouli & Aiden Yengbalang Danyi, “Promoting Local Acceptability of International Oil Companies 
(IOCS) Through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): The Case of Tullow Oil in Ghana” (2015) 1:1 Financial Risk & 
Management Reviews 45.
49 See “Draft Local Content Policy of Tanzania for the Oil and Gas Industry”, April 2014, p. iii, online: http://www.tanpetstate.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Local-Content-Policy-2014-Draft.pdf.
50 Ibid at iii (italics mine for emphasis). 
51 Ibid at 7.
52 Ibid at 25.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid at 25–26.
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development opportunities arising from an oil or gas project, specifically directed to 
strengthen the sustainability, relevance and political visibility of community investment 
programmes.”55 To Warner “community content is about realising a competitive advantage 
for the oil company in the eyes of both the local population and the country’s guardians of 
economic policy.”56 The distinction between community content and local content programs 
is that whereas the former is a “merit good” directed at supporting those adversely affected 
by extractive resource projects, local content programs represent “public good[s]” although 
from a global perspective they may also be regarded as merit goods in that they give 
privilege to nationals and firms from within the country as against other nationals and 
firms.57 
Warner suggests that community content should be pursued as a separate policy from local 
content. This is because community content would present some unique challenges. For 
instance, opportunities for employment provision at the community level would be severely 
hampered by the greater lack of available skills at the community level when compared 
to available skills at the national level.58 Therefore achieving community content would 
require strategically building the skills capability of local communities to enable them to 
capture the opportunities created by oil and gas resource projects.59 One writer has argued 
that this model, though “progressive”, may face implementation difficulties because it 
would involve “considerable undertakings” by oil and gas companies to provide sustained 
assistance to local firms to improve their capabilities and to provide financial support 
such as “venture capital, credit guarantees and short-term loans to local suppliers and 
contractors”.60 The writer appears to assume that the building of local capacities is the sole 
responsibility of the companies. However, there is a considerable role for the government, 
such as the establishment and strengthening of educational centres and institutions where 
relevant skills are taught. Moreover, the provision of financial credits to local suppliers 
would be the responsibility of financial institutions, supported by the government, and not 
that of oil and gas companies. However, pursuing a separate community content policy 
does not necessarily mean pursuing it independently of LCPs. Rather, it can be embedded 
into an LCP framework by giving specific recognition to the communities surrounding 
the resource extraction in matters of employment and in the procurement of goods and 
services.
A clear definition of local in LCPs is important, especially in African countries where 
relationships between extractive companies and their host communities as well as between 
extractive communities and their governments are very fragile due to struggles over land 
and due to the adverse impact of resource extraction on surrounding communities and the 
absence of strong regulatory structures. An LCP designed to give special recognition to the 
55 Michael Warner, “Community Content: The Interface of Community Investment Programmes with Local Content Practices 





59 Ibid at 8.
60 See Ugwushi Bellema Ihua, “Local Content Policy and SMEs Sector Promotion: The Nigerian Oil Industry Experience” 
(2010) 5:5 International Journal of Business Management 6.
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communities or subnational regions where the resource extraction takes place may provide 
a mechanism for addressing this fragility. As the World Bank has noted in connection with 
the extractive industry in Africa, “[l]ocal employment is consistently the top concern of 
communities located near extraction projects, and often a central issue behind disputes, 
grievance and conflict. More local jobs result in more support for projects.”61 This is 
supported by “a growing body of evidence that demonstrates that deliberate community 
action can and does influence the local economy and is capable of improving the quality of 
life for local residents”.62 It is particularly supported by subnational economic development 
theory, which calls for a regional or local approach to development,63 as well as by 
subnational competitiveness theory, which views subnational growth as “a generative 
process” and national growth as “an aggregate” of subnational growth and calls on national 
policymakers to focus on enhancing subnational growth, as this would engender national 
growth eventually.64
In addition, community content can help improve company-community relations, enabling 
companies to obtain the social licence to operate.65 Given the negative impacts of oil 
and gas development on surrounding communities, local community content can help 
to compensate the afflicted communities through job creation and value addition in the 
communities.66 It has been observed that community displeasure over lucrative oil and 
gas jobs being handed to outsiders, with only menial jobs going to the communities, poses 
a significant threat to the success of oil and gas projects.67 Community content can also 
help governments in conflict-prone countries or those emerging from conflict to achieve 
“political harmony” through its potential to address some of the equity issues that all too 
often lead to resource conflicts.68 The continuing conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta has been 
attributed to lack of proper management of local community expectations.69 The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development has found that “community relations 
issues are a significant obstacle to the implementation of a speedy, strife-free local content 
development in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria.”70 Writing from his experience of the 
61 World Bank, “Human Capital for the Oil Industry” (2014), supra note 16 at 4.
62 S Markey et al, Second Growth: Community Economic Development in Rural British Columbia, (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2005) at xiii.
63 
Nwapi, “Defining the ‘Local’” (2015), supra note 33 at 187–216.
64 Suahasil Nazara, Michael Sonis & Geoffrey JD Hewings, “Interregional Competition and Complementarity in Indonesia”, 
Discussion Paper 01-T-02, The Regional Economic Applications Laboratory, March 2000, p. 3, available at: http://www.real.
illinois.edu/d-paper/01/01-t-2.pdf. 
65 
Ana Maria Esteves & Mary-Anne Barclay, “Enhancing the Benefits of Local Content: Integrating Social and Economic 
Impact Assessment into Procurement Strategies” (2011) 29:3 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 205. 
66 Rabiu Ado, “Local Content Policy and the WTO Rules on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS): The Pros and 
Cons” (2013) 2:1 International Journal of Business and Management Studies142.
67 
Ana Maria Esteves, Bruce Coyne & Ana Moreno, “Local Content Initiatives: Enhancing the Subnational Benefits of 
the Oil, Gas and Mining Sectors”, Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) Briefing, July 2013, p. 6, online: RWI, http://www.
resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWI_Sub_Enhance_Benefits_EN_20131118.pdf. 
68 Ado (2013), supra note 66, p. 142. 
69 
U Idemudia & UE Ite, “Demystifying the Niger Delta Conflict: Towards an Integrated Explanation” (2006) 33:109 Review 
of African Political Economy 391–406.
70 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNCTAD/CALAG African Oil 
And Gas Services Sector Survey, Volume 1 – Nigeria: Creating Local Linkages By Empowering 
Indigenous Entrepreneurs, UNCTAD, Geneva, 2006, 79, online: http://commodities.open.
ac.uk/8025750500453F86/%28httpAssets%29/4BFA672B2FFEF5AA8025782B003DA71C/$file/UNCTAD%20_%20Oil.pdf.
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social tensions in the oil-bearing Niger Delta region of Nigeria, a former General Counsel 
of Chevron Nigeria has described as “a serious shortcoming” the absence of community 
content requirement in Nigeria’s local content legislation.71 Countries can also use LCPs to 
“re-direct the rents arising from economic undertakings … away from foreign investors 
and towards specific groups, firms or regions in the host country”,72 thus directing some 
of the benefits also away from the national government. Such redistribution can serve “to 
ensure that the profits and employment from natural resource extraction are felt directly in 
the communities where the extraction is done”.73 Recognition of community content in LCP 
frameworks can serve as an effective tool for such redistribution. 
Fragouli and Danyi have argued that local communities in Ghana who view local content 
from a localist perspective do not agree that that oil and gas resources are found on their 
territory does not give them ownership rights over them, as stipulated by the Ghanaian 
constitution, which gives ownership of the resources to all Ghanaians. They argue further 
that these communities also do not agree that the goal of the LCP is to promote engagement 
of the capacities and businesses of all Ghanaians in the oil and gas value chain without 
regard to ethnic or regional origin or proximity to the resources. In order to manage local 
perceptions and expectations over the LCP, the scholars recommend that the Ghanaian 
government and civil society should engage in educating the communities about the 
meaning of local content.74 Since oil and gas resources are not subject to private ownership 
in the emerging East African countries, these arguments apply with equal force to East 
Africa.
The above view ignores the exceptional hardship that local communities within the 
proximity of the resources suffer due to such proximity. The approach Fragouli and 
Danyi recommend would lead to exclusion rather than inclusion of local communities 
in the oil and gas value chain. Relations with local oil and gas communities do not call 
for government posturing and insistence on strict legal and constitutional rights. To be 
clear, community content does not mean precluding other nationals within the country 
from consideration in the distribution of the benefits of LCPs. Rather, community content 
is better regarded as a sub-component of an LCP, requiring, for instance, that first 
consideration be given to resource-bearing communities before other nationals in matters 
of employment and procurement of goods and services, or requiring a certain percentage 
of these to be allocated to the communities where those communities meet needed 
specifications and where they do not, a requirement that deliberate effort be made to build 
their capacity to meet those specifications. 
There is a strong case for East African countries to consider a localist approach to LCP. 
Like other regions in Africa, East Africa is characterized by a huge sense of ethnic identity 
among each country’s nationals. That is to say, East Africans are more likely to identify 
themselves by their ethnic origin than by their nationality. Uganda presents the most 
71 Oguine (2011), supra note 42 at 428.
72 WTI Advisors, “Local Content Requirements and the Green Economy”, paper presented at the Ad Hoc Expert Group 
Meeting on Domestic Requirements and Support Measures in Green Sectors: Economic and Environmental Effectiveness 
and Implications for Trade, 13–14 June 2013 Salle XXI, Palais des Nations Geneva, p. 10, online: http://unctad.org/
meetings/en/Contribution/DITC_TED_13062013_Study_WTI.pdf. 
73 Ibid.
74 Fragouli & Danyi (2015), supra note 48 at 48.
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extreme form of this, having the highest index of ethnic fractionalization in the world.75 
In Tanzania, there is additional significant tension between black Africans (who dominate 
political power) and Asian and Arab Tanzanians (who dominate the business sector).76 
This foretells how the local communities around the resources in East Africa, particularly 
in Uganda, are likely to vent their grievances should the extraction impact negatively on 
them.77 The risk of a head-on collision between the East African governments and/or the oil 
companies operating there, on the one hand, and the local communities on the other is thus 
readily apparent.
Notwithstanding the above argument, the localist strategy may come with some tradeoffs. 
But the tradeoffs are not insurmountable and the advantages of the strategy may outweigh 
the consequences of the tradeoffs. For instance, the localist strategy may not promote 
supplier diversification and may not offer adequate opportunities to the country’s best, 
in terms of technical and managerial expertise, to participate in the development of the 
oil and gas sector in the country. However, the benefits of maintaining social stability in 
the resource-bearing region and, more broadly, national unity that such a strategy would 
bring about may be more important for national economic development than the loss to be 
occasioned by these tradeoffs. 
B. Use of Mandatory Targets
A major problem with LCPs is that local skills availability frequently lags behind industry 
needs. Many oil and gas companies have used this as an excuse for not meeting local 
content directives. Oguine has, for instance, pointed out as follows:
The challenge here is determining the extent to which opportunities can reasonably be 
provided to Nigerian companies to supply goods and services to the petroleum industry, 
even when they do not necessarily offer the best value, so that they can develop their 
capacities. A regulatory body needs to distinguish between capacity that is available but 
currently limited and that can be enhanced, and capacity that is simply not available or 
so limited that to insist on its use will cause significant economic loss to the operators 
in the petroleum industry and the nation.78
Civil society organizations have found that in Ghana oil and gas companies have difficulties 
finding local staff with the requisite education and skills to fill available positions, and that 
in Nigeria company ownership requirements imposed under the Nigerian content law have 
fostered the formation of hollow companies by local entrepreneurs who front for foreign 
companies that have the capabilities to execute oil and gas projects.79 Industry stakeholders 
in Nigeria have argued that about 70 per cent of the contracts awarded to Nigerian 
companies are executed overseas, thereby defeating the goal of developing in-country 
75 Alberto Alesina et al, “Fractionalization”, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No 1959, 2002, p. 8, 
online: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4553003/alesinassrn_fractionalization.pdf?sequence=2
76 David Booth et al, “East African Prospects: An update on the political economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda”, 
ODI Report, May 2014, p. 35, online: http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8945.pdf. 
77 Odour et al (2014), supra note 6 at 192–193.
78 Oguine (2011), supra note 42 at 418.
79 See Kenya Civil Society, (2014), supra note 20 at 40.
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capacity.80 The same has also been pointed out with respect to Angola.81 Imposing stringent 
conditions regarding the use of local labour and local procurement may therefore not 
achieve the best outcome. Specifically, it may not be the best way to address the capacity 
problem as it incorrectly assumes that the requisite skills are available. It has accordingly 
been argued that local content works best to create value where the necessary technical 
and vocational skills are available.82 A better approach for an emerging oil and gas country 
would therefore be to focus first and foremost on local skills development by developing 
skills training programs for young people in relevant areas so as to catch up with the needs 
of the industry. Such development of local skills can be facilitated through the LCP by 
requiring firms to invest in local skills training to complement efforts by the government to 
establish relevant skills training institutions for its nationals. 
Ghana presents a pertinent example of a new oil and gas producing country that has  
shown strong commitment to skills development that East African countries can learn  
from. The skills shortage in Ghana was described as “contribut[ing] to a workforce  
structure shaped like a steep Egyptian pyramid or the Eiffel Tower”, the base of which  
comprised of unskilled workers employed in activities that required little technology.83 In  
2013, Tullow Oil led the Jubilee Partners to set up a $15 million state-of-the-art training  
centre at the Takoradi Polytechnic, Ghana. This is a public-private initiative aimed at  
addressing the skills gap in technical and vocational education in the oil and gas industry.84  
The initiative is further supported by an education foundation established by the Ghana  
National Petroleum Corporation and the World Bank provided further support with a 
$4.7 million fund to support training in relevant engineering fields.85 In Kenya, it must be 
noted however, Tullow has, in collaboration with Africa Oil Corporation, established a 
polytechnic in Lodwar to provide oil and gas training to Kenyans.86
Rather than setting stringent targets, an incremental approach to promoting local content 
over time may ensure greater benefits. As a country continues to invest in training of local 
professionals, the level of local content required of companies can be increased gradually, 
in proportion to a reasonably projected increase in the availability of qualified local 
professionals and firms to take up the opportunities. 
80 Whitehall Capital Partners Limited, “PIB and Nigerian Local Content”, 2012, p. 9, online: http://www.whcpt.com/Pib-
Nigerian-Local-Content.pdf. 
81 Zeferino Teka, “Linkages to Manufacturing in the Resource Sector: The Case of the Angolan Oil and Gas Industry” (2012) 
37 Resources Policy 466.
82 Chinyere Shirley Ayonmike & Benjamin Chukwumaijem Okeke, “The Nigerian Local Content Act and Its Implications on 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and the Nation’s Economy” (2015) 3:1 International Journal of 
Education Learning & Development 30.
83 Kwamina Panford, “An Exploratory Survey of Petroleum Skills and Training in Ghana” (2014) 60:3 Africa Today 62.
84 See Jim Playfoot & Phil Andrews, “Education and Training for the Oil and Gas Industry: Case Studies in Partnership 
and Collaboration – Case Study 5 – Takoradi Polytechnic and the Ghanaian Energy Industry: An Education/Industry 
Partnership to Build an Energy Workforce for Ghana” (San Diego: Elsevier Inc, 2014) 59–70. 
85 Panford (2014), supra note 83 at 60.
86 Kenya Civil Society (2014), supra note 20 at 40.
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C. Promoting Project Linkages
There is a noticeable assumption in the design and even more in the implementation of most 
LCPs in developing countries that the capture of economic benefits from the presence of 
foreign investors can come merely through employment generation and the participation of 
local firms.87 As studies have shown, however, despite an observable increase in the number 
of Nigerians in managerial and professional positions in oil and gas companies in Nigeria, 
evidence of technology transfer is minimal.88 Inadequate attention is paid to the potential 
benefits that could come from project linkage or what has been termed “‘off-project’ 
strategies”.89 Off-project strategies is the involvement of companies in “local content 
capability development outside of a particular employment, supplier or sub-contractor 
contract, such as through community investment programmes”.90
Morrisey identifies three basic types of linkages: (1) those relating to employment, (2) 
those relating to demand for inputs from local suppliers, and (3) those relating to supply of 
inputs to local producers.91 Regarding employment, linkages occur through the provision 
of training that firms provide to their workers, as such training can benefit local firms 
if the workers later move to work for local firms.92 Labor turnover is thus regarded as a 
significant factor in linkage development between the oil sector and the non-oil sectors. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, due to limited labour mobility and the fact that foreign 
firms tend to provide firm-specific training because they bear the costs of training, linkages 
through employment are limited.93 It has however been reported that in Nigeria, 56.5 per 
cent of oil companies are aware of their former employees who developed expertise while 
working with them but who later moved to other sectors.94 On the other hand, inputs from 
local suppliers carry linkage potentials because in the effort to meet the demands of foreign 
firms, local firms improve their production standards and practices. Similarly, when foreign 
firms supply inputs to local producers, some technology is implanted in it that benefits local 
producers.95 
Promotion of project linkage is critical to the economic diversification of the local economy. 
As the International Monetary Fund has pointed out, albeit with reference to São Tomé 
and Príncipe, the development of specific activities in the oil sector cannot be undertaken 
without reference to other sectors.96 The link between the oil sector and the non-oil sectors, 
87 Warner (2007), supra note 59 at 2.
88 Jean Balouga, “Nigerian Local Content: Challenges and Prospects”, International Association for Energy Economics 
Newsletter, Third Quarter, 2012, 24, online: www.iaee.org/en/publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=176. 
89 Warner (2007), supra note 59 at 2. 
90 Ibid at 3.
91 Morrissey (2012), supra note 28 at 27.
92 Ibid at 28.
93 Ibid.
94 Adeolu O Adewuyi & T Ademola Oyejide, “Determinants of Backward Linkages of Oil and Gas Industry in the Nigerian 
Economy” (2012) 37 Resources Policy 456.
95 Ibid.
96 Ulrich Klueh et al, “Inter-sectoral Linkages and Local Content in Extractive Industries and Beyond – The Case of São 
Tomé and Príncipe”, IMF Working Paper, WP/07/213, September 2007, p. 24, online: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
wp/2007/wp07213.pdf. 
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such as agriculture, tourism and finance, may be viewed as symbiotic.97 Some economic 
activities outside the oil sector can provide inputs to the growth of the oil industry. For 
instance, the provision of decent housing and other services to oil company employees 
constitutes an input into the oil sector. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, it 
can result in the emergence of a robust tourism industry in the region of the country where 
the oil facilities are located. Also, revenues from oil can be used “to carry out well-targeted 
productivity enhancing investments” in other sectors.98 There is therefore very strong 
potential for the emergence of the oil and gas industry in East Africa to boost the non-
oil sectors and for these other sectors to in turn boost the oil and gas industry. LCPs can 
contribute to enhancing the positive aspects of this symbiotic relationship when informed 
by this principle of sectoral interconnectedness and targeted at programs that carry the 
entire economy along at the same time.
Project or sectoral linkages do not occur unconditionally. “The industrial policy 
environment matters.”99 In their investigation of the factors which influence linkage 
development between foreign firms and domestic firms in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Amendolagine et al find that “[f]oreign firms with a local partner and those with a final 
market orientation” interact more closely with local firms and so have a higher potential 
to contribute to linkage development.100 They also find that local linkages are higher when 
the local management of the foreign plants enjoys a high degree of decisional independence 
from the headquarters of the parent company.101 Their research demonstrates that foreign 
firms with technological knowhow too advanced for the domestic economy do not have 
high linkage potentials since their interactions with domestic firms would be minimal and 
superficial. Another interesting finding of their research is that Chinese companies have low 
linkage potentials in Sub-Saharan Africa and that this may be due to language and cultural 
barriers. Other factors that influence linkage development include a reliable legal system, a 
functioning institutional setting and public private partnerships.102 
In addition, whether linkages will deliver benefits depends on whether they result in 
spillovers, defined as the occurrence of knowledge transfer to, or learning by, local firms. 
Thus, linkages may occur without or with limited spillovers, either because foreign firms 
do not support knowledge transfer by withholding pertinent information, or because 
local firms are unable to learn from what is transferred due to limited capacity to attract 
able workers.103 Research has found that spillover effects occur when the ownership of 
investment projects is shared between domestic and foreign firms, for in such cases foreign 
firms are more likely to source their suppliers locally and so would be more willing to share 
their technology since this can improve the performance of their suppliers, whereas wholly 
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Morrissey (2012), supra note 28 at 27.
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owned affiliates would tend to import their inputs.104 Compared to the manufacturing and 
telecommunication industries, there are fewer linkage benefits in the extractive sector in 
Africa because extractive sector linkages in Africa are seldom accompanied by spillovers, 
as the sector provides mostly basic employment with little learning and knowledge 
transfer.105 As Morrissey concludes,
a proper understanding of the failure of FDI to truly benefit sub-Saharan African 
economies lies in exploring the failure to develop a coherent industrial policy. Without 
such a policy, they are unable to identify the important linkages to promote through 
FDI, and even less able to provide the incentives and capabilities for spillovers to occur. 
More fundamentally, meaningful spillovers imply learning – knowledge transfer occurs 
and the beneficiaries are able to apply this knowledge. The search for spillovers should 
be a search for learning.106
These findings point to the way industrial policy should be formulated to play a pivotal 
role in shaping linkages. A country that seeks to promote linkages must be strategic and 
systematic in the kind of firms it wishes to attract and in the nature of the conditions it 
imposes on such firms before they can operate. Inter-sector knowledge transferability must 
be written into local content legislation. Provisions that require firms to invest in local skills 
training can as well as those that require firms to procure their goods and services locally 
help in achieving this.
East African countries must therefore strengthen the environment for linkage development. 
This requires promoting the growth and capacity development of institutions and 
organizations that help to build the socio-economic assets and infrastructure on which 
industries depend.107 These institutions and organizations include: Educational institutions 
and vocational training institutes, credit providing institutions, cooperatives and other small 
business associations, entrepreneurship organizations, and relevant government agencies 
and departments such as company registries and tax offices.108 The capacity development 
of government institutions is particularly important, for in matters relating to business 
licencing and regulatory enforcement, for instance, inefficiency can slow down linkage 
development by delaying project approvals which in turn can lead to corruption and 
discourage competition. Like most other regions in Africa, East Africa has fared poorly 
in this regard. This is apparent in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 2015 report109 
as shown in the table below of the emerging oil producing countries in East Africa under 
consideration. 
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105 Morrissey (2012), supra note 28 at 28 and 29.
106 Ibid at 31.
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EASE OF DOING BUSINESS IN EAST AFRICA
Kenya Madagascar Mozambique Tanzania Uganda
Overall Rank out of 189 136 163 127 131 150
Starting a Business 143 37 107 124 166
Dealing with 
Construction Permits 95 177 84 169 163
Getting Electricity 151 189 164 87 184
Registering Property 136 153 101 123 125
Getting Credit 116 180 131 151 131
Protecting Minority 
Investors 122 87 94 141 110
Paying Taxes 102 65 123 148 104
Crossborder Trading 153 109 129 137 161
Enforcing Contracts 137 146 164 45 80
Resolving Insolvency 134 129 107 105 98
Derived from World Bank Ease of Doing Business 2015 Report. 
Given the above outlook, the challenge for East Africa is to enhance the capacity of the 
relevant institutions to remove needless bottlenecks. This requires a clear policy focus. In 
a study of backward linkages in the mineral sector in Tanzania, Mjimba finds that policy 
– understood as a “plan to guide action towards concerted goals and/or objectives” – is the 
main driver of linkages and that the main public policy problem in Tanzania is the failure 
of governments to align sectoral policy with macro policy as well as failure to implement 
already formulated policy.110 The scarcity of basic social infrastructure such as roads, water 
supply and telecommunication in Tanzania limits the development of linkages between 
the extractive sector and the rest of the economy.111 This speaks to the need for appropriate 
policy formulation by East African countries to enhance the development of linkages 
between the oil and gas sector and the macro economy.
D. A Regional Approach
A critical challenge for African countries is how to design the LCP to reflect their peculiar 
development needs. It has been suggested that due to the acute shortage of specialized 
extractive sector skills in most African countries, acting individually, African countries 
cannot achieve much with the policy and that a regional approach would be more effective. 
Lalbahadur for instance argues that while the promotion of technology and skills transfer 
is one way to address the skills crisis in Africa, another possible way is “a more strongly 
focused African strategy.”112 She suggests that a more liberal foreign labour would 
benefit a country like Mozambique that has an acute skills shortage, but that this calls for 
reconsideration by the Mozambican government on how it can enhance its development by 
110 Vuyo Mjimba, “The Nature and Determinants of Linkages in Emerging Minerals Commodity Sectors: A Case Study of 
Gold Mining in Tanzania”, MMCP Discussion Paper No 7, University of Cape Town and Open University, March 2011,  
pp. 43–44, online: http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/sites/cssr.uct.ac.za/files/pubs/MMCP%20Paper%207_0.pdf. 
111 Ibid.
112 Aditi Lalbahadur, “A Regional Approach to National Development Priorities in Mozambique?”, 20 March 2013, South 
African Institute of International Affairs, online: http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/a-regional-approach-to-national-
development-priorities-in-mozambique.
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“linking its foreign investment and socio-economic development strategies more closely 
with that of its region.”113 The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies believes that “Kenya’s 
role as a regional hub for East African crude oil and petroleum products may be more 
significant than its potential position as an oil and gas producer.”114 This belief stems from 
the fact that Kenya’s oil reserves are estimated at about 600 million barrels, suggesting that 
even if new discoveries are made, Kenya may still remain a small oil producer.115 It may 
therefore make economic sense for Kenya to share oil facilities, such as pipelines, with 
its neighbours. Such cooperation would open opportunities for a regional local content 
development.
While the idea of regional integration has been extensively discussed in the literature, a 
local content dimension to it peered through only very recently. The rationale behind it is 
that the comparative advantages that each country enjoys can be strategically mobilized 
to meet the supply needs of the regional extractive industry (White, 2012). It has been 
argued that while the idea behind LCPs is to promote local participation in FDI, restrictions 
to employment of foreign labour may hurt a country’s economic growth by restricting 
the crossborder exchange of information and technology transfer and denying local 
professionals learning opportunities that the presence of foreign professionals provides.116
However, unlike regional cooperative mechanisms on other issues, it is not yet clear 
what form a regional approach to LCPs can or should take. What should be the guiding 
principles informing such a framework? What type of implementation structures would 
be effective? Given how difficult it has been for public and private actors to work together 
within a given country under most LCP frameworks, achieving the level of public-private 
partnership required for a regional content development must be challenging. The strikingly 
varied levels of technological and human capacity among African countries may cause low 
capacity countries to fear that relatively high capacity countries may take an opportunistic 
approach to the policy to capture the employment benefits that otherwise would have 
gone to their own nationals. The recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa suggest that a 
regional content approach may meet local opposition in some countries, especially in areas 
of employment. A detailed analysis of these issues requires a separate study, but some 
preliminary thoughts can be penned here.
A regional approach to LCPs may take the form of regional governments providing a 
framework for the development and inter-country transfer of specialized skills. The 
1997 Southern African Development Commission Protocol on Education and Training 
could be utilized to provide highly-skilled training to Southern African professionals in 
the extractive industry. The East African Community could model such an initiative for 
East African countries. A country would be better positioned to draw on resources from 
its immediate neighbours than from more remote countries. That is why sub-regional 
frameworks might be more effective than an African-wide framework. However, an 
African-wide framework can serve as a continental coordinating mechanism to support 
sub-regional frameworks by linking the sub-regions together and creating opportunities 
113 Ibid. 




for cross-pollination of resources. The Economic Commission for Africa appears to be 
developing such a framework through the launching of the African Mineral Skills Initiative 
(AMSI) in 2012 to reduce the skills shortage in African mining.117 Part of AMSI’s strategy 
is to create regional centres of specialization that offer education and training programmes 
in critical and specialized mineral-relevant skills that African countries can draw on.118 
However, this initiative can be broadened to include the oil and gas sector as well and can 
be used to provide a foundation upon which an African regional content framework for the 
extractive sector as a whole can be built. 
In May 2015, the African Development Bank published a draft strategy for the African 
Natural Resources Centre established by the Bank in 2013 to deliver capacity building 
programs to regional member countries of the Bank.119 Under the strategy, the Center’s 
activities would span seven renewable and non-renewable economic sectors: Water, forestry, 
fishery, land, oil, gas and minerals and would focus on addressing a range of policy, legal 
and institutional capacity challenges facing African countries in these sectors.120 
For a regional extractive sector LCP framework to be effective, however, it must include 
mechanisms to promote interaction among companies, professional associations and policy-
makers in the extractive sector and to facilitate regional mobility of labour. It may also take 
the form of technical partnerships among East African countries to promote the exchange 
of technical experts in the oil and gas sector. Countries would therefore be required to adopt 
more liberal foreign labour laws and policies that address bureaucratic bottlenecks in the 
processing of work permits. 
In addition, an effective regional content arrangement ought to be based on a number of key 
principles, perhaps most importantly, relevance, accessibility and equity. Relevance means 
that the framework must enable each country to draw only skills that are relevant to its 
skills priorities. To achieve this, any regional specialized training centres established must 
be informed by an empirical survey of the types of skills needed in all the participating 
countries. Accessibility speaks to the ease of mobility of labour across the region. 
This imposes a burden on participating countries to remove unnecessary bureaucratic 
bottlenecks that make employment of foreign workers difficult. Equity means that the 
framework must be designed to guard against the domination of weaker countries by 
stronger countries. For instance, admission to established specialized training institutions 
must be evenly distributed among nationals of the participating countries, taking into 
account, however, the skills priorities of each of the countries. In addition, benchmarks 
must be established for assessing the effectiveness of the arrangement over time, to 
ascertain where and what types of improvements are needed.
117 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “Mineral Skills Initiative to support Africa’s Mining Vision”, ECA Press 
Release 175/2012, online: http://www1.uneca.org/ArticleDetail/tabid/3018/ArticleId/2203/Mineral-Skills-Initiative-to-
support-Africas-Mining-Vision.aspx. 
118 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “Concept Note: African Mineral Skills Initiative Pre-ADF VIII Event”, 
22 October 2012, online: http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/adfviii/Documents/Pre-ADF/Pre-ADFVIIIConceptNote_
AfricanMineralsSkillsInitiative.pdf. 
119 African Development Bank, African Natural Resources Centre (ANRC): Draft Strategy for 2015 – 2020, Draft version for 
online consultation, May 2015, online: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Draft_
African_Natural_Resources_Center_Strategy_for_2015_%E2%80%93_2020.pdf. 
120 Ibid at 3.
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Lastly, a regional strategy does not necessarily mean an abandonment of any consideration 
of national or even community content. Rather, these could all be part of an integrated 
approach to local content. A regional approach enables neighboring countries facing similar 
challenges to pull their institutional resources together to enhance the local capacity of 
each country. In matters of employment, for instance, a country would still give priority 
to its nationals (or first priority to the communities where the resource development takes 
place, if a country adopts the community content) and then draw from the labour force of 
the participating countries to fill any remaining skills gap. The main emphasis of a regional 
strategy should therefore be on training and education. 
E. Avoiding Elite Capture and Corruption Vulnerability
LCPs can be subject to capture. The Global Witness has found that following the passage 
of the Angolan and Nigerian local content laws, a number of indigenous companies in 
both countries have either been assigned shares in oil licences or been pre-qualified to 
bid for shares in such licences, even though the beneficial owners of the companies are a 
matter of top secret or are identical with some public officials.121 The organization decries 
the “opacity” that has characterized the oil licencing process in both countries. It further 
observes that corruption associated with LCPs is “even more damaging than one-off 
payments for contracts because it means revenues can be stolen from the state continuously 
and in a way that is much more difficult for an audit to detect”.122 Corruption also damages 
a country’s business reputation and puts foreign businesses at the risk of violating the 
extraterritorial antibribery laws of their home countries.123
Investigations have shown how Angolan elites and public officials are reaping huge 
benefits from Angola’s LCP, which requires foreign companies to partner with indigenous 
companies when bidding for oil licences. There is increasing evidence that foreign oil 
companies are paying huge fees to Angolan public officials and economic elites to form 
“‘front’ companies” that frequently lack the technical and financial capacity to carry out 
oil operations.124 Top members of the Angolan government control the ownership and 
shareholding structure of the Angolan partner companies.125 Similarly, it has been argued 
that while lack of “linkage formation” and “low institutional capacity and governance” are 
significant problems hindering the potential of LCPs to generate real economic development 
in Africa, underlying these problems is elite capture:
The real problem is that ruling elites have little incentive to support linkage 
development for domestic economic entrepreneurs if they are without much political 
121 Global Witness, “Rigged? The Scramble for Africa’s Oil, Gas and Minerals: A Report by Global Witness”, January 
2012, p. 8, online: https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/RIGGED%20The%20Scramble%20for%20
Africa%27s%20oil,%20gas%20and%20minerals%20.pdf. 
122 Global Witness, “Blueprint for Prosperity: How South Sudan’s New Laws Hold the Key to a Transparent and Accountable 
Oil Sector”, November 2012, p. 17, online: http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/Blueprint%20for%20
Prosperity_LR_1.pdf. 
123 Ibid.




importance for the survival of the ruling elites. Instead, ruling elites protect and engage 
with domestic economic entrepreneurs who have already captured the local content 
markets, because this is where rents can be extracted from entrepreneurs in support of 
elite political survival strategies.126
If the promotion of linkage development through LCPs actually mattered to the ruling 
elite, they would ensure that institutional and governance capacity is strengthened and 
supported.127
The above view is confirmed by other studies which cite lack of a clear divide between 
the public and the private in most resource-rich developing countries as a major reason for 
elite capture of LCPs.128 Many public officials have close ties with the economic elite and 
in several cases are the chief beneficiaries of LCPs. In their study of industrial policy (the 
progenitor of today’s LCPs) in Nigeria, Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwe identify “politicization 
of ethnicity”, “distributive politics” and “special interests” as impediments to the realization 
of industrial policy in Nigeria.129 The authors describe how these factors have combined 
to create opportunities for persons whose overriding goal is to acquire their (ethnic or 
personal) share of the “national cake instead of helping to bake it” to rise to positions 
of authority.130 As a result, even well-conceptualized and well-designed policies fail at 
the implementation level because those responsible for their implementation are often 
indistinguishable from the economic actors.131 These views find ample support in the theory 
of “regional favoritism” – a form of distributive politics and rents-seeking characterized by 
political leaders adopting mainly policies that favour their preferred regions – believed to be 
pervasive in Africa although common in other continents as well.132
East Africa therefore must guard against the risk of corruption undermining their ability 
to maximize the benefits of LCPs. To address the capture-corruption problem in LCPs, it 
would be necessary to impose public disclosure requirements on companies bidding for oil 
and gas contracts regarding their ownership and shareholding structure. Other mechanisms 
that can promote transparency include the streamlining of the oil bidding process to 
remove complex and unnecessary bottlenecks that make compliance with the requirements 
cumbersome and that promote opacity, and government publication of names of companies 
bidding for licences as well as their beneficial owners and shareholding structure.133 In 
addition, there is need for caution in granting small local companies oil and gas exploration 
126 Michael W Hansen et al, “The Political Economy of Local Content in African Extractives: lessons from Three African 
Countries”, Paper presented at 46 Årsmøde i Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab, okt, 23 – 24, 2014, Vejle, Denmark, p. 3, 
online: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/9014/Wendelboe%20Hansen.pdf?sequence=1. 
127 Ibid at 4.
128 Maíra Martini, “Local Content Policies and Corruption in the Oil and Gas Industry” U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 
September 2014, p. 6, online: http://www.u4.no/publications/local-content-policies-and-corruption-in-the-oil-and-gas-
industry/.
129 NI Ikpeze, CC Soludo & NN Elekwa, “Nigeria: The Political Economy of the Policy Process, Policy Choice and 
Implementation” in Chukwuma Soludo, O Ogbu, & H Chang, eds, The Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy in Africa: 
Forced Consensus? (Trenton, Africa World Press, 2004) 342–343. 
130 Ibid at 342.
131 Ibid at 347.
132 See, e.g., Roland Hodler & Paul A Raschky, “Regional Favoritism” (2014) 129:2 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 996.
133 Chilenye Nwapi, “Corruption Vulnerabilities in Local Content Policies in the Extractive Sector: An Examination of the 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, 2010” (2015) 46 Resources Policy 95.
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rights, as such companies are unlikely to have the technical and financial capacity to 
carry out large-scale operations. Allowing such companies, after they have been granted 
exploration rights or other licences, to sell their interests to foreign companies with the 
competence to carry out the operations may defeat the goal of LCPs.
CONCLUSION
Increasing oil and gas finds in East Africa offer significant opportunities to East African 
countries to fast track economic development and ensure that public welfare improvements 
are delivered to their citizens. One approach to doing so that is increasingly being adopted 
by developing countries is the LCP. LCPs enable a country to capture the benefits of foreign 
direct investment by imposing conditions on foreign investors to ensure value addition in 
the country. The challenge for East Africa, however, is how to design the policy to reflect 
their unique economic development needs and local conditions. This paper has considered 
LCP options and perspectives that East African countries may consider. Two key options 
identified and discussed in this paper are a localist approach and a regional approach 
to the LCP. A localist approach may be utilized to address a number of other problems 
associated with extractive resource development that have historically impeded most 
African countries from fully realizing the potential benefits of their extractive resources. 
For instance, it can also be used to improve company-community relations. It can be used 
to partially compensate the local resource-bearing communities for the negative impacts 
of oil and gas development. On the other hand, a regional strategy can help East African 
countries to pull their resources together through, for instance, the establishment of joint 
technical and vocational training centres for the training of their oil and gas professionals 
in relevant skills. The paper also discusses and emphasizes the need for the promotion of 
linkage development through the LCP in East Africa and identifies some of the factors that 
can promote linkage development. The adoption of stringent local content targets that do 
not take into account the skills gap in the country may hurt rather than help the realization 
of the potential of the LCP to fast-track economic development in East Africa. To benefit 
optimally from the LCP, however, it is important for emerging oil and gas producers to 
inject transparency measures into the design and implementation of the policy to avoid 
or reduce the likelihood of elite capture of the benefits of the policy. Although the policy 
options discussed here are not exhaustive, it is hoped that the paper can serve as a useful 
policy guide to emerging oil-producing East African countries as they tread their way 
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